Dealing with the Trade Deficit in a Floating Rate System by Richard N. Cooper
RICHARD  N.  COOPER 
Harvard University 
Dealing with the Trade  Deficit in a 
Floating Rate System 
THE  VOLATILITY  of the dollar  in the last several years has led to serious 
second thoughts  worldwide  about  the desirability  of a system of floating 
exchange  rates. The emergence  of dissatisfaction  was predictable.  The 
exchange  rate  is the most important  price of any nation's  economy after 
the  wage  rate,  and  the  wage  rate  is splintered  into  thousands  of fragments. 
Firms are deeply upset by price movements they do not understand. 
Economists may have the best of the argument  when they say that the 
total uncertainty  in the economic system is not increased by flexible 
exchange rates, although  even that  judgment  depends on assessments 
of the extent to which an exchange rate commitment  can "discipline" 
national  economic policies and also on the prevalence of autonomous 
bandwagon  movements  in the foreign  exchange  market.  But  that  conclu- 
sion is no consolation to those in the goods-producing  heart of the 
economy who feel directly  the impact  of foreign  price fluctuations.  For 
them  uncertainty  has  risen,  and  I predict  that  it  will  prove  to be intolerable 
and  that  they will insist on political  action  to reduce  it. 
Specifically,  there  will be pressures  for protection  against  sudden  and 
unpredictable  foreign  competition  due to movements  in exchange  rates. 
There will also be pressures for controls on capital flows to reduce 
exchange rate movements. And there will be  pressures for direct 
intervention  in currency  markets  to the same  end. Most countries  of the 
world  continue  to peg their  currencies  to something,  and  the creation  of 
the European  Monetary System (EMS) also represents a movement 
away from  flexible  exchange  rates. I have elsewhere suggested  that the 
best way to reduce exchange rate uncertainty is  for the industrial 
democracies  to adopt, at a point suitably  distant  in the future, a single 
currency. 
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In the long meantime, various halfway houses will be sought. The 
EMS is one illustration.  Proposals  for reference  rates and target  zones 
should  be taken seriously and studied  carefully, so the recent decision 
by the Interim  Committee  of the International  Monetary  Fund in favor 
of serious staff  work  on these questions  should  be welcome. In the end, 
however, I suspect that even the more exacting of these schemes will 
prove to be technically  flawed  or to entail major  loopholes or to fail to 
cover all of the important  possibilities, so that a regime  of discretionary 
and  negotiated  exchange  rate  management  is what  we will  have  to endure 
until  we are  ready  for  more  far-reaching  commitments  regarding  national 
economic actions. In what follows I discuss how such exchange rate 
management  looks from  an American  perspective  in the spring  of 1986. 
Although immediate economic prospects for most Americans are 
reasonably  good, the large trade  deficit and federal budget  deficit  pose 
two serious  long-term  problems.  The  weak U. S. export  markets  and  stiff 
competition  from imports  that resulted in the large trade deficit have 
been squeezing  employment  and  profits  in American  manufacturing  and 
mining.  Firms  and  labor  unions  are seeking  protectionist  relief  on a scale 
not seen since 1970, and perhaps not since 1930, when the infamous 
Smoot-Hawley  Tariff  Act raised  American  tariffs  to a level second only 
to that attained  under the 1828  Tariff  of Abominations.  By early 1986 
several  hundred  import-restrictive  bills  had  been  introduced  in Congress, 
and one, a comprehensive bill on textiles and apparel, had actually 
passed, though it encountered a presidential veto.  Momentum  was 
mounting for an omnibus trade bill that certainly would have been 
restrictive in purpose and effect. Such legislation would hurt U.S. 
consumers and would almost certainly induce other countries with 
budgetary  or competitiveness problems to follow the same course. It 
thus could lead to a dismantling  of the liberal trading  regime built so 
painstakingly  since World  War  II and  to increased  international  political 
acrimony.  Moreover,  countries  with serious  foreign  debt  burdens  would 
find servicing their debts even more difficult and would be strongly 
tempted  to abandon  the effort  altogether,  thus turning  a trade  crisis into 
a financial  and  a foreign  policy crisis as well. 
The second problem  is that the United States has been building  up 
both its public and its external debt at a rapid rate. Federal debt has 
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figure  amounting  to about  half  of gross  national  product.  If debt  continues 
to grow much more rapidly  than GNP, an ever larger  share of income 
will eventually have to be taxed in order to service it. Furthermore, 
much  of the debt, or its equivalent  in private  obligations,  is accruing  not 
to Americans  but to foreigners, the financial  counterpart  of the large 
U.S. trade  deficit,  which is being  financed  by borrowing  abroad.  In 1984 
the United States imported (net) $107 billion in capital from abroad, 
more  than  the entire  Brazilian  external  debt, and  in 1985  this figure  rose 
to $118 billion. Without  corrective action, the United States will have 
borrowed  half a trillion  dollars  from abroad  between 1983  and 1987, a 
debt that can be serviced only out of future  income. That would be no 
special  problem  if the foreign  funds  were being  invested  at rates  of return 
to American investors in excess of the cost of borrowing. But U.S. 
domestic investment  has not been exceptionally  strong  in recent years, 
and the foreign loans have been used to finance public spending  with 
little or no future  economic yield. 
The United States has in effect borrowed  against  its future  income to 
enjoy immediate  consumption,  both public and private. Servicing the 
external debt will mean lower living standards  for the future, both 
because of interest to be paid to foreign lenders and because of the 
deterioration  in the terms  of trade  necessary  to generate  the  trade  surplus 
required  to service the debt. The primary  burden  will fall mainly  on the 
working  population,  which already  faces the burden  of supporting  the 
growing  number  of social security  recipients. 
With its large trade deficit, the configuration  of the U.S. economy 
poses an unacceptable  threat  to the liberal  trading  system and imposes 
an unwarranted  burden  on future  generations  of Americans.  This says 
nothing  of the anomaly,  from  a global  perspective, of the world's  richest 
country being the largest net importer  of capital. To head off these 
problems  requires  a substantial  reduction  in both  the U.S. budget  deficit 
and  current  account  deficit. 
Shifts in Policy 
A look  at saving  and  investment  in  the U.S. economy  suggests  strongly 
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Table 1.  Relationship between Foreign Investment and National Saving and Investment, 
United States, Selected Years, 1966-85a 
Percent  of GNP 
Net  Gross  Government  Gross 
foreign  private  budget  domestic 
Year  investment  =  saving  +  surplusb  -  investment 
1966  0.5  17.0  -0.2  16.7 
1973  0.6  18.0  0.6  17.6 
1979  0.1  17.8  0.5  18.1 
1984  -  2.4  18.4  -  2.9  17.9 
1985  -  2.9  17.4  -3.5  16.8 
Sources:  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis,  The  Natiotnal Income  atnd Produict 
Accouints of  the  United  States,  1929-1982  Statistical  Tables,  table 5.1  (Government  Printing Office,  forthcoming), 
and Suirvey of Curretit Busitness, vol.  66 (March 1986). Figures are rounded. 
a.  The equation in the table is not exact  because  it omits the staListical discrepancy  in the NIPA. 
b.  Federal plus state and local  surplus. 
accounts  identity,  net foreign  investment  (approximately  the balance  on 
goods and services) must  equal  the excess of national  saving  (the sum  of 
private  saving  and the government  surplus)  over domestic  investment. 
As table 1  suggests,  gross  private  saving,  including  corporate  retained 
earnings  and  capital  consumption  allowances,  was exceptionally  high  in 
1984,  while gross domestic  investment  at 17.9  percent  of GNP was only 
slightly  above normal  for a boom year. What  was not normal  for a boom 
year was the large public deficit, which absorbed private saving and 
required  an inflow of resources from the rest of the world to cover the 
normal investment. If the government  accounts had been in balance 
(state and  local governments  actually  showed a surplus  of $64  billion,  or 
1.7  percent  of GNP, in 1984),  the United States on this accounting  would 
have produced  a healthy and not abnormal  trade surplus  in goods and 
services, about 0.5 percent of GNP. So long as the federal  government 
deficit  runs  4 to 5 percent  of GNP, the United States can be expected to 
run  a substantial  trade  deficit  except in a period  of deep recession, when 
domestic  investment  falls way off. It is not realistic  to expect an  increase 
in private  saving  large  enough  to balance  the external  accounts, partic- 
ularly  since aggregate  private  saving  is not consistently and  predictably 
responsive  to alterations  in public  policy. 
A substantial  reduction  in the budget  deficit,  therefore,  is a necessary 
condition for a substantial  improvement  in the trade balance with the 
economy operating  at anything  like current  levels of activity. The need 
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the president  accept it. Sharp  disagreements  still exist on how fast the 
deficit should be reduced and, more important,  on how it should be 
reduced.  Moreover,  sharp  discrepancies  between declared  policies and 
actions suggest that skillful  political  posturing  is more important  to the 
key actors than the actions actually  taken. Nonetheless, prospects for 
deficit  reductions  are much  better  now than  they were a year ago. 
In December of 1985  Congress  passed and the president  signed the 
Balanced  Budget and Emergency  Deficit Control  Act. The bill, better 
known as "Gramm-Rudman,"  sets a series of declining  deficit targets 
starting  with $208 billion in fiscal year 1986 (a target that would have 
been $172  billion  except that  required  cuts were limited  in the first  year) 
and declining  to zero in fiscal year 1991. If Congress were actually to 
meet these deficit  targets,  the fiscal shift would impose severe contrac- 
tionary  pressures  on the U.S. economy that  would  generate  a recession 
unless offset by sources of demand  elsewhere in the economy. 
What  might  these sources be? Further  increases in consumption  not 
related  to disposable  income are unlikely,  given the already  low house- 
hold saving rate and the relatively  high levels of household  debt. That 
leaves investment  and exports as possible sources of demand  to offset 
the conitractionary  fiscal  policy. 
Lower interest rates could increase investment, especially housing 
investment,  which  in recent  years has been below what  might  have been 
expected on the basis of new household  formation.  The drop in long- 
term interest rates of nearly 300 basis points between early 1985 and 
early 1986  (most of the decline occurring  before the passage of Gramm- 
Rudman)  should stimulate  housing construction.  Progress  in reducing 
the budget deficit should lead to further  easing of long-term  interest 
rates. Short-term  Treasury  bill rates, by contrast, actually increased 
modestly  from  June  through  December  of 1985  after  having  fallen  steeply 
in April  and May. The rising  rates suggest a rather  firm  stance of U.S. 
monetary  policy, even though  the MI money supply  continued  to grow 
much  more  rapidly  during  1985  than  the 7 percent  upper  limit set by the 
Federal  Reserve in February  of that year. The M2 money supply  grew 
throughout  the year near the 9 percent upper limit range. Because 
inflationary  pressures  did not reemerge  and  because sensitive materials 
prices actually  weakened  throughout  1985,  it became desirable  to ease 
monetary  policy further  to stimulate  housing construction  by the time 
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indeed in March the Federal Reserve lowered its discount rate, and 
Treasury  bill rates dropped  nearly  50 basis points, the largest  decrease 
since June 1985. 
The Role of Exchange Rates 
The other  component  of demand  that  could in principle  and should  in 
practice take up the slack created by fiscal contraction  is net exports. 
There is no shortage  of industrial  and agricultural  capacity to expand 
exports:  despite  economic  recovery since 1982,  the entire  U.S. tradable 
sector has been depressed  by foreign  competition.  The obvious solution 
to competitiveness  problems  is a low value  of the dollar  relative  to other 
major  currencies,  particularly  the yen and  the European  currencies. 
The United States found  itself last fall in a situation  in some respects 
analogous to that of many less developed countries: it faced a large 
payments deficit caused mainly by an expansionist fiscal policy. The 
important  difference was that the U.S.  budget deficit had not been 
monetized-indeed  monetary policy had been rather tight-and  the 
United States had been able to finance its current  account deficit by 
borrowing  abroad.  (With  flexible  exchange  rates the causation  actually 
ran  from capital  inflows  to trade  deficit;  the financing  occurred  first, so 
to speak.) And the remedy  was also analogous:  the budget  deficit must 
be reduced  to reduce the trade  deficit, but to avoid economic recession 
the currency  must  be devalued  to provide  incremental  external  demand 
to compensate  for the reduction  in domestic  demand. 
One way to pose the problem is to note that the Gramm-Rudman 
targets  entail cutting  the high-employment  budget  deficit  by about  $120 
billion, roughly  3 percent of GNP, over the period 1985-88. Since the 
most urgent reason for reducing  the budget deficit was to reduce the 
trade deficit, it seemed appropriate  that the trade sector make up the 
bulk  of this loss in demand. 
The new Group  of Five initiatives of September  22, 1985, were an 
attempt  to address the trade  balance problem  by operating  directly on 
the exchange rate. Although Gramm-Rudman  had not been passed, 
policymakers  probably  contemplated  a declining  path  for future  budget 
deficits. The new initiatives did raise important  questions. Could the 
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fixed  exchange  rates?  If so, how far  and  how fast should  it be encouraged 
to fall? 
Is it possible  for economic officials  to "talk  down" the exchange  rate 
in opposition to the economic fundamentals?  Most economists would 
answer with an unequivocal "no." Their models do not allow it. The 
more pertinent  question, however, is whether the market  will respond 
at once to changes  in the fundamentals  in the way that  currently  popular 
portfolio-balance  rational  expectations models suggest that it will. Will 
a credible  reduction  in future  budget  deficits  really  lead to an immediate 
and  appropriate  drop  in long-term  interest  rates and depreciation  of the 
country's  currency?  My guess is that  the world  does not work  that  way. 
Unclarities  about  the present  and  uncertainties  about  the future  create  a 
sluggishness  in exchange  market  response and  lead market  participants 
to give little weight to the future beyond, say, the next year or two.1 
Exchange  market  expectations are fragile,  weakly held, and subject  to 
crowd  effects. Under  these circumstances,  official  announcements  rein- 
forced by even modest supporting  action can have a strong  impact on 
exchange  rates. 
There will be a lively debate during the next few years over the 
respective roles in producing  the sharp  drop in the dollar  over the past 
year  of (1)  the  foreign  exchange  market  coming  to its senses, (2)  improving 
prospects for reduction in the federal budget deficit, (3) easier U.S. 
monetary  policy starting  in early 1985, (4) a temporary  tightening  of 
monetary  policy by Japan  in October 1985, (5) exchange market  inter- 
vention  on a considerable  scale, especially  by Japan,  and (6) announce- 
ments  of concern  about  the prevailing  exchange  rates  by finance  ministry 
1.  Some see the decline in the dollar following passage of the Gramm-Rudman bill as 
support for a strong link between  future budget deficits and current exchange  rates. But 
the dollar decline began nine months before passage  of the act and was reinforced by a 
turnabout in the U.S.  Treasury position on the wisdom of exchange  market intervention 
at the Group of Five meeting of September 22, 1985. Gramm-Rudman was finally enacted 
into law in December  1985. A key provision was declared unconstitutional  by a federal 
court in February 1986. Moreover, a poll of the fifty U.S. governors in March 1986 revealed 
that only  16 percent thought that Congress  would actually enforce  the Gramm-Rudman 
targets (Reported in Newsweek,  March 24, 1986, p. 32), and the Drexell Burnham Lambert 
poll of 462 institutional investment decisionmakers in February (before the court decision) 
showed an expected  budget deficit of $142 billion in fiscal year 1990. This was down only 
$24 billion from the results of a similar poll taken in June 1985 and still markedly above the 
Gramm-Rudman target deficit of $36 billion for that year (reported in Decision-Makers 
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officials, especially of the United States, starting  in September  1985. I 
believe that the announcements  were important,  in the sense that the 
dollar  exchange  rates would  not have moved so much  between Septem- 
ber 1985  and February  1986  without  them. This is not to argue  that the 
dollar  would have fallen as much as it did on the strength  of announce- 
ments alone. 
As to the "correct" value of the dollar, a number  of approaches  can 
be used to provide  ballpark  estimates. Morgan  Guaranty  Trust's World 
Financial Markets regularly includes an index of the real effective 
exchange  rate  of the U.S. dollar,  an index  that  weights  the bilateral  rates 
with fifteen  other  currencies  by U.S. trade,  after  correcting  for changes 
in each country's price index for manufactures.  In February  1985  this 
index  rose to a peak  30  percent  above its 1980-82  average  and  38  percent 
above its level in March  1973,  when  generalized  currency  floating  began. 
By December 1985  it had fallen to 12 percent above 1980-82. Because 
of the timing  of monthly movements, the average rate for 1985  was 3 
percent above the average for 1984, despite the sharp  decline later in 
1985.  During  1980-82  the U.S. current  account  was close to balance  on 
average. Restoration of the  1980-82 real value of the dollar would 
require,  on one calculation,  exchange rates of 1.25 Canadian  dollars  to 
the U.S. dollar, 186  yen to the U.S. dollar, and 2.11 deutsche marks  to 
the U.S. dollar  for the three  largest  U.S. trading  partners  covered in the 
index.2 
A more sophisticated  calculation  has been done by John  Williamson 
using the International  Monetary  Fund's Multilateral  Exchange Rate 
Model, which is weighted  to take into account responsiveness of trade 
to changes in rates.3  Williamson  targets a $12 billion current  account 
deficit  for the United States, which would imply a swing of about $105 
billion  from 1985,  not quite the 3 percent of GNP required  to offset the 
$120  billion  contraction  in the full-employment  budget  deficit  mandated 
by Gramm-Rudman  between 1985  and 1988.  Williamson  calculates  that 
nominal  rates of 198 yen and 2.04 deutsche marks  to the dollar would 
have been the appropriate  rates in the final quarter  of 1984  to achieve 
2.  Personal communication from Rimmer de Vries. 
3.  John Williamson,  The Exchlange Rate  System  (Washington,  D.C.:  Institute  for 
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the current  account  targets  he stipulated  for each of these countries.4  If 
Japan  removed its voluntary  export restraints,  the corresponding  ex- 
change  rates  would  be 182  yen and 2.09 marks  to the dollar. 
Williamson's  figures  can be used as a starting  point, but they must  be 
qualified  in a number of ways. First, allowance for Japan's relative 
productivity  growth and its external claims accumulated  during 1985 
would  yield a somewhat  lower yen-dollar  rate, say 190  yen to the dollar, 
by the end of 1985. Second, some allowance  must be made  for the fact 
that  the observed  current  account  deficit  in 1985  reflected  exchange  rates 
prevailing  one to two years earlier,  and actual  late 1984  exchange rates 
would yield a larger deficit. In that event a dollar depreciation to 
Williamson's  equilibrium  real effective exchange rate would produce  a 
movement  in the current  balance  somewhat  larger  than  $105  billion. On 
the other  hand,  the swing  in the current  balance  wouid  take  several  years 
even if the new rates were achieved immediately,  and the budgetary 
contraction  is expected to continue beyond 1988, the horizon adopted 
for this discussion.5  Third,  Williamson  assumes smaller  current  account 
surpluses  and  stronger  domestic  demand  in Japan  and  Germany  than  are 
likely to prevail  in the next few years. 
Finally,  the sharp  drop  in the price  of oil in early 1986,  while affecting 
input  costs similarly  in all  major  industrial  countries,  will  have a strongly 
differential  impact  on the trade  balances  of those countries.  For  instance, 
oil in 1984  accounted  for about  one-third  of import  payments  for Japan, 
but only 16 percent  for the United States and 15 percent  for Germany. 
Britain  was a net exporter  of oil. Thus the sharp.  drop in oil prices will 
have a proportionately  greater positive impact on Japan's current 
4.  Ibid.,  p. 81. Williamson  (pp.  82ff.)  also  cites estimates  of equilibrium  exchange  rates 
by others, calculated  in various ways. Broadly  speaking,  they are in the same general 
vicinity  as Williamson's  rates. The greatest  disagreement  concerns  the yen, with several 
estimates being close to Williamson's,  but a few others calling for a much greater 
appreciation  of the yen. 
5. Stephen  Marris  believes  exchange  rate  adjustment  must  go much  further  to achieve 
current account balance. See Marris, Deficits and the Dollar: The World  Economy at Risk 
(Washington,  D.C.: Institute  for International  Economics, 1985),  pp. 129,  169.  But  Marris 
allows  for the large  accumulation  of external  debt  that  will occur  over the several  years it 
will take  to reestablish  balance,  whereas  the objective  here  is to offset the contractionary 
fiscal impact, not to restore full current  account balance. Needless to say, all these 
exchange  rate calculations  presuppose  stipulated  rates of growth  and demand  pressures 
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account. Moreover, 14 percent of U.S.  merchandise  exports in 1984 
went to oil-exporting  countries,  compared  with 11  percent  for Japan  and 
8 percent for Germany, so the drop in oil prices is likely to have a 
proportionately  greater  negative  effect on U.S. exports. On  both  counts, 
that  would require  some further  appreciation  of the yen, to around  175, 
and some depreciation  of the British  pound. 
Taking  all  these points  together,  the dollar-yen  and  dollar-pound  rates 
were probably  about  right  by April  1986,  although  the German  mark  and 
other  EMS  currencies  were still  undervalued  by 5-10 percent.  Of  course, 
from  the U.S. perspective  alone, a stronger  yen could compensate  for a 
weak mark.  And to the extent that neither  Japan  nor Germany  engages 
in greater  domestic stimulus,  both currencies  were still too weak for the 
purpose discussed here. On the other hand, the drop in oil prices will 
provide some stimulus  to U.S. domestic demand  in 1987-88, once the 
initial  negative  impact  has passed. 
The fall in the dollar's  exchange  rate has been so dramatic  that it has 
generated  some concern that the dollar  would fall too far too quickly. 
However, I believe it has been appropriate  to bring  the dollar  down as 
rapidly  as possible. There  are several reasons  for preferring  this course 
despite the general proposition that gradual  adjustment  of economic 
variables  is normally  less costly than  rapid  adjustment. 
First,  changes  in  monetary  policy and  in exchange  rates  affect  demand 
for goods and services only gradually,  whereas expenditure  cuts affect 
demand  rapidly.  Therefore,  exchange rate action must precede budget 
cuts. 
Second, a sharp, well-defined drop in the dollar reduces foreign 
investors' uncertainties  about future declines. Inevitably the United 
States will have to continue borrowing  abroad  during  the next several 
years, for a cumulative  total of several hundred  billion dollars. So long 
as the dollar  is expected to drop, foreigners  will hesitate to lend unless 
U.S.  interest rates are high enough to compensate for the expected 
decline.  Yet on domestic  grounds,  and  for  the good of the world  economy 
as well, U.S.  interest rates should fall further, not rise. Thus it is 
preferable  to have a sharp  drop  in the dollar  and  to impose  the inevitable 
capital  losses sooner rather  than later. Bygones will then be bygones, 
and foreigners  will be willing to continue to lend, even at low interest 
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Third,  a depreciation  of the dollar  was necessary sooner  or later, and 
whenever it came, it would have led to price increases for imported 
goods and  for those domestic  goods in close competition  with  them. The 
inflation  gains  that  the United States "borrowed"  from  the future  when 
the dollar  appreciated  so sharply  have  to be repaid.  It is usually  estimated 
that each 10 percent  real depreciation  of the dollar  will lead eventually 
to  increases in the consumer price index of  1-2 percent. Rudiger 
Dornbusch  and  Stanley  Fischer  estimate  that  the direct  impact  on prices 
is 1.25  percent, occurring  after  a mean  lag of three quarters,  with a total 
effect of 2.1 percent  operating  through  induced  wage increases  as well.6 
If the total effect is spread  over two to four years, it will be lost in all of 
the other pressures that are also operating,  and it will be impossible, 
without economic slack and higher  unemployment,  both of which are 
undesirable, to prevent these price increases from having their full 
impact  on wage  increases. But  if the inflationary  impact  comes relatively 
quickly, as part of a deliberate  and well-explained  program,  there is at 
least a chance that it will not be passed fully into wage increases. That 
chance  is fortunately  increased  at present  by the sharp  drop  in oil prices, 
which  could  greatly  ease the pain  of the inevitable  inflationary  impact  of 
dollar  depreciation.  Insofar  as prices do rise from  a once-for-all  drop  in 
the dollar, the increase should be accompanied  by a less-than-propor- 
tionate once-for-all  increase in the money supply  to avoid the contrac- 
tionary  impact  of the higher  prices. In short, monetary  targets  should  be 
raised  for 1986,  but not for subsequent  years. 
A fourth  argument  for a sharp  rather  than  a gradual  drop  in the dollar 
is that it puts early and strong pressure on other leading countries, 
especially  Japan  and Germany,  to back off from  their  fiscal contraction 
and  their  reliance  on export-led  growth.  These countries  are too large  to 
rely on export-led  growth  (over half of the new orders  for capital  goods 
in Germany  during 1985  were foreign orders, substantially  more than 
the 30 percent share of exports in Germany's  GNP), especially when 
there are unemployed resources at home and when many countries 
around  the world  are in desperate  need of export  markets. 
6. Rudiger  Dornbusch  and Stanley Fischer, "The Open Economy:  Implications  for 
Monetary  and Fiscal Policy," in Robert  J. Gordon,  ed., The  American  Business Cycle: 
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An objection  sometimes  raised  to a rapid,  deliberate  depreciation  of 
the dollar  is that it will get out of control  and  go too far. Furthermore,  a 
sense of loss of control  over a depreciating  dollar  might  so unnerve  the 
financial  and business community  that investor caution would nullify 
the stimulative  effects of dollar  depreciation.  Such concern cannot be 
completely  dismissed. It underlines  the importance  of how the policy is 
executed and  the clarity  with  which  the broad  strategy,  if not the specific 
numerical targets, must be explained. Bandwagon effects in which 
market  sentiment  derives  solely  from  market  sentiment  can be influenced 
by official  action. Moreover,  a slow decline in the dollar  is also subject 
to bandwagon  effects after  a time, the more so if the expected decline in 
the dollar  is not compensated  by a higher  interest  yield, as already  noted. 
The  foregoing  analysis  assumes  that  the U.S. budget  deficit  should  be 
gradually  reduced  and that, with the Gramm-Rudman  act, the deficit  is 
on a declining  path. However, exclusive reliance  on expenditure  cuts is 
not the best way to reduce the deficit. Indeed, one wonders whether 
President  Reagan  has ever troubled  to look at the numbers  involved. If 
one protects from cuts both defense and social security, as he desires, 
and  also interest  payments,  as everyone takes for granted,  then in fiscal 
year 1986 only an estimated $282 billion in government  expenditures 
remain,  as against  a projected  deficit,  before  automatic  Gramm-Rudman 
cuts, of $220  billion. In other  words, to eliminate  the deficit  exclusively 
by cutting  unprotected  expenditures  would require  virtual  elimination 
of government  beyond the Defense Department  and a bare-bones  De- 
partment  of Health  and Human  Services. Eighty  percent  of the remain- 
der-law  enforcement,  foreign  affairs,  highways  and  airports  and  parks, 
welfare and health programs (other than medicare), space, energy, 
agriculture,  and so on-would  have to go. This is not going to happen. 
Either defense and social security will have to be cut consequentially, 
or some form  of tax increase  will be necessary. 
Viewed from the perspective of last fall, macroeconomic  policy for 
the United States required  a firm commitment  to reduce the federal 
budget  deficit, but gradually  so as to permit  actions that would avoid a 
recession; a tax increase as a part of the fiscal action; expansionary 
monetary  policy to help counteract  the contractionary  fiscal  action;  and 
a sharp  drop  in the value of the dollar  brought  about  partly  by exchange 
market  intervention  and  partly  by  jawboning. 
Some of these policy actions have already  been taken or are under Richard N. Cooper  207 
way. The drop in the dollar  is an essential part of this policy package, 
and  the specific  actions  taken  last September  have been appropriate  and 
effective. The dollar's decline will help offset the fiscal contraction 
through  expansion  of net exports, help maintain  overall U.S. economic 
activity at a satisfactory level, and head off the strong protectionist 
pressures that, in the peculiar political circumstances  of 1986, might 
erupt  into damaging  protectionist  action. 